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Abstract
The problem of calculating the optimal dispatch and prices in a
single-period electricity auction in a wholesale electricity market is
considered here. The novel necessary and su±cient conditions of opti-
mality for this problem are derived and computational algorithms for
solving these conditions are constructed.
Keywords: Optimal dispatch; Electricity market; Nonlinear program-
ming; Non-convex problems; Dynamic programming.
Introduction
Economic dispatch problem for electricity generation has been the focus of
numerous studies (eg [1], [5]) for a long time. Recent market deregulation
led to its reformulation. Calculating market-based economic dispatch still
requires solving non-linear programming problem but this problem became
qualitatively di®erent. Firstly, its objective function became the "cost of
generation", de¯ned as suppliers' price-volume bid functions integrated over
their dispatched volumes. In most markets these bids are step-wise functions.
This yields discontinuities of gradients and reduces the e±ciency of standard
numerical methods. Secondly, because negative price steps are commonly
used in bids the market-based dispatch problem is non-convex and may have
multiple solutions. These are the distinguishing characteristics of dispatch
problem in a deregulated electricity market which make it important to de-
velop algorithms especially tailored to solve them e±ciently.
1In this paper we develop novel necessary and su±cient conditions for dis-
patch and pricing problem in a deregulated electricity market and construct
computational methods, based on these conditions, capable of e±ciently cal-
culating dispatch and prices.
Dispatch in Australian electricity market
We consider normal trading only, did not consider any trading in auxiliary
markets, reserves etc. Electricity market is described as a network of scalar
°ows, which is standard in modelling of economic electricity dispatch. The
model considered in this paper is used in practice to dispatch the Australian
market, NEM see [3], [4].
Thus, we consider electricity market that includes n regional markets
connected by a network of interregional connectors, which transfer electricity
between them, (Fig. 2). Each participant (generator or consumer) is located
in one of the regional markets. All participants in one regional market are
paid or pay the same regional price for electricity they sell or consume. That
is, each regional auction is a single-price auction. As a rule, regional prices in
di®erent regions are di®erent. Every trading day is divided into a sequence of
identical single-period auctions. A single period auction is in fact a number
of linked regional auctions that take place in all regions simultaneously. The
results of a single period auction depends on generators' price-volume bids,
the state of the market (regional generations and inter-regional °ows) before
the auction, and the regional demands. These auction results determine
regional dispatches - the amounts of electricity sold by every generators in
the region, power °ows between regions and the regional prices.
Generators submit price-volume bids to the market operator. These bids
are step-wise functions that show how much power they are prepared to
supply for a particular price (Fig. 1). Price steps P k
i in price bids could
be (and indeed often are in practice) negative. That is, the producer o®ers
to pay a consumer who agrees to buy its electricity. Trading day is divided
into sequence of equal-time periods. Market operators calculates dispatch
for each of this period by running single period electricity auction, using the
following information:
² Combined regional demands by all consumers di;
² Combined regional price-bids Pi(qi) by all generators,
² Combined regional generations before the auction qi(0),















































Figure 2: F ragment of regional markets' network.





i . Regional generations are range-constrained qmin
i · qi · qmax
i . Inter-
regional energy °ows gij from the i-th to j-th region are also range con-
strained, gmin
ij · gij · gmax
ij . These constraints are due to technological and
dynamical reasons. Note that gij = ¡gji.
We assume that when the power gij is transferred from i-th to the j-th
regional markets some of it is lost and this loss is described by the func-
tion Lij(gij). This function is a given continuous function of gij such that
Lij(gij) = Lji(¡gij) = Lji(gji), Lii(x) ´ 0, Lij(0) = 0, Lij = Lji, Lij > 0
for gij 6= 0 and
d2Lij
d2gij > 0 for 8gij. Characteristic dependence Lij(gij) on gij
is shown in Fig. 3. The loss Lij is divided between corresponding markets
in a ¯xed proportion giving additional demand ®ijLij in the i-th region and
®jiLij in the j-th region, Fig. 4. ®ij are constants, 0 · ®ij · 1, ®ji = 1¡®ij,
®ii = 0.












Since gij = ¡gji and ®ij + ®ji = 1, 8i;j = 1;:::;n this balance holds if the
3Figure 3: Characteristic dependence of power loss Lij on the power °ow gij.
Figure 4: Two markets linked by inter-connector.
regional energy balances






; i = 1;:::;n (2)





The optimal dispatch is determined by minimizing the combined cost of







subject to range constraints
q
min
i · qi · q
max
i ; i = 1;:::;n (5)
4g
min
ij · gij · g
max
ij j = 1;:::;n; i = 1;:::;n (6)
and regional markets' energy balances (2). We denote its solution as q¤
i;g¤
ij
and the value of the objective function (the minimal cost of supply) as
I





The cost of generation I and the minimal cost of generation I¤ both depend
not only on di but also on the bids Pi(qi) and pre-auction state of the market
qi(0), gij(0) (via range constraints on qi and gij).
The unknown variables in the optimal dispatch problem (4), (5), (25), (2)
are the regional generations and inter-regional °ows after the auction. If
network contains connections between all regional markets then the number
of unknown variables here is n2¡n
2 +n =
n(n+1)
2 ; n ¸ 0. The ¯rst term is the
number of unknown exchange °ows gij and the second term is the number of
generated regional powers qi. Since these variables obey n balance equations
(2) the number of free unknowns in the dispatch problem is equal to the
number of inter-reginal °ows,
n(n¡1)
2 for a network where all regional markets
are connected. For n = 1 there is one unknown, for n = 3 - three, etc.
Note that the problem (4-25) is not easy to solve, it has both range
constraints on its independent variables and constraints on its dependent
variables qi.
Necessary conditions of optimality




























ij · gij · g
max
ij i;j = 1;:::;n: (10)
5The independent unknown variables now are the °ows gij. Regional genera-
tions are calculated from balances (2).
We de¯ne reduced price of the region i with respect to region j as













and for j-th with respect to i-th it is






















~ Pab(gij ¡ ²):
The necessary conditions of optimality for dispatch problem is then given
by the following
Theorem. If fg¤
ijg is an optimal solution of the problem (8){(10) then
one of the following conditions holds
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Proof. We derive the proof by examining the ¯rst variation of the function
I. The particular form of problem's constraints allows us to simplify the
problem by solving some of its constraints explicitly.
First we consider the case were both range constraints (9), (10) are not
binding and Pi and Pj are continuous at gij. Di®erentiation leads to the
following expression for the variation of the objective function
¢I = ( ~ Pij ¡ ~ Pji)¢gij:
Since here both positive and negative variations of ¢gij are feasible, the
current arguments are where the bid functions are continuous, ~ P
+
ij = ~ P
¡
ij =
~ Pij and ~ P
+
ji = ~ P
¡
ji = ~ Pji, the necessary condition of optimality (condition of
non-improvement of I by a feasible in¯nitesimal variation of gij) coincides
with (12).
Let us consider the general case of possible discontinuous points of Pi and/or
Pj. Since Pi is a non decreasing and Pj is a non increasing functions of the













±(¢gij)(£+(¢gij) ¡ £¡(¡¢gij)) +
+( ~ P
+
ij ¡ ~ P
¡
ji)£+(¢gij) + ( ~ P
¡
ij ¡ ~ P
+
ji)£¡(¡¢gij) (17)
where ±(x) is the Dirac function, £+(x) = 1, if x > 0 and 0 otherwise. The
¯rst term here describes the net e®ect of two jumps in bids.
Suppose all range constraints are not binding. Then ¢gij are not constrained
and can have arbitrary sign. Therefore, the condition ¢I¢gij ¸ 0 that
guarantees that gij is not improvable by in¯nitesimal variation of ¢gij become
(12).
Finally, if at least one of the following conditions gij = gmax
ij or qmax





hold, then only negative variations ¢gij are feasible. In
this case the condition ¢I¢gij ¸ 0 takes the form (16). The same derivations
for the case, where only positive ¢gij are feasible conclude the proof.
7Long-chain conditions of optimality
Consider a linear subnetwork of three regional markets. Suppose that





The °ows is directed from i-th to the j-th and then j-th to the k-th markets.
The range constraint on the generation in the j-th market is active. This
prohibits positive variation of gij. However, two simultaneous positive vari-
ations ±gij = ±gjk > 0 are feasible. Analysis identical to a single connector
analysis above yields the following conditions of optimality for non-binding


































































For binding range constraints these condition of long-range optimality is
exactly the same as for short-range optimality above - but for long-range
reduced prices (lhs and rhs of (18)) instead of short-range reduced prices (11).
They state that for the optimal dispatch two regional markets connected by
a network of generation-constrained intermediate markets are di®erent, can
have di®erent long-range reduced prices if and only if at least one of the
°ows between them is constraint or the generation in one these two markets
is range constrained.
P P P i j
￿








Figure 5: 3-market linear fragment.
Numerical methods
In practice dispatch and prices in most of the markets now is solved by
linearizing dispatch problem and then solving it numerically using classical
linear programming algorithms (see [3], [4]).
8The derived condition of optimality require that reduce prices between
linked regional markets be equal unless °ow constraint or generation con-
straint becomes binding. They can be used to ¯nd the dispatch optimization
numerically.
As an initial point this algorithm requires a feasible set of °ows gij such that
range constraints(25) and (9) hold. This solution is then improved iteratively
by applying the following elementary computational operation:
(1) calculate the reduced prices di®erence ¢ ~ Pij = ~ Pij ¡ ~ Pji for every pair of
regions connected by inter-connector;
(2) mark all pair where one of the optimality conditions holds;
(3) for each unmarked pair if ~ P
¡
ij > ~ P
+
ji then gmin





j < qj(gij) < qmax
j then gij is increased, until one of these
inequalities becomes equality. This increase continues across jumps of the
price-volume bids, provided that the reduced i-th price at these new steps is
still lower that reduced price ~ Pji. Similarly, if ~ P
¡
ij < ~ P
+
ji then gij is reduced
until either reduced prices equalize or one of range constraints becomes bind-
ing. The improved solution is again submitted as an input to step (2).
The iterations will converge because variation of gij increase one of the prices
Pi, Pj and decreases another. After iterations converge, one can use its output
as an initial solution for another iterative algorithm which uses the improve-
ment operation for 3-market substrings instead of 2-market ones, then for
4-market etc.
The conditions of maximal equalization of reduced prices between all regions
across the network can be maintained by an automatic feedback control sys-
tem. This would allow to replace the sequence of single-auctions with a single
continuous real-time auction and will approve dispatch dramatically.
Non-convexity of the dispatch problem when bids have
negative price steps
We illustrate non-convexity by plotting the cost of generation I(g) as a func-
tion of g in Figure 7 for the market with two regional markets, regional bids
P1(q) and P2(q) shown in Figure 6, and losses L(g) = 0:14g2 equally divided
between regional markets. The graph clearly shows that I(g) has two min-
ima. The left minimum corresponds to I¤ = ¡269:137, g¤ = ¡11:21 and
dispatches q¤
1 = 37:59 and q¤
2 = 60.
The link between non-convexity of dispatch problem and negative prices
in bids can be traced using the following analysis. Each regional cost of
generation (integrated price-volume bids) Ci(qi) is a convex, piece-wise linear
function. Therefore, the total cost of generation - the sum of regional costs
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Figure 7: Cost of supply for two regional markets in the example as the
function of inter-regional °ow.
of generation - is also convex on qi. But after we express these variables
in terms of inter-regional °ows gij using energy balances (2) the objective
function of the single-period auction problem becomes non-convex. Indeed,

























ij > 0 the sign of d2
dg2
ijCi coincides with the sign of the price-
volume bid (current price step). Thus, the use of negative price steps in bids
is the causes of non-convexity.
Thus, if one solves the necessary conditions of optimality derived above or
uses a direct search to minimize the cost of supply, then there is no guarantee
the the solution found is one of the local minima. That is why it is important
10to verify if the solution found is local or global minimum and it is local then
how close the local minimum is from the global one, how much improvement
in terms of the cost of supply can be achieved if search for optimal dispatch
continues from another initial point.
Globally optimal dispatch.
Consider relaxation of the optimal dispatch problem (4), (5), (25), (2) by
deleting range constraints on the °ows (25) and regional energy balances (2).









qi = M (23)
q
min
i · qi · q
max
i ; i = 1;:::;n (24)
M here is the parameter that describes inter-connectors losses and which














Bellman function ([6]) is de¯ned using the following recurrent equation






























Lij(gij) = M (28)
Suppose we used numerical algorithm described in the section above and
obtained g¤
ij, q¤
i, I¤ and M¤ =
P
i q¤
i. Áh(M¤) then gives the lower bound on
11the cost of generation I. If it turns out that I¤ = Án(M¤) then g¤
ij, q¤
i is the
global minimum. If jI¤ ¡ Án(M¤)j is small enough then one may reasonably
decide to stop search and use the current local minimum instead of global
one.
Entrepreneurial inter-connectors
Entrepreneurial lines represent another new feature of modern electricity
markets. Physically they are no di®erent to the standard inter-regional con-
nectors that are controlled by market operator. But entrepreneurial lines
operate di®erently. Before trading starts they submit price-volume bids,
that are identical to generators price-volume bids. They submits these bids
for two regional markets connected by their line. These bids are the o®ers
to °ow energy, which are taken into account when single-period auction is
calculated.
Let us consider for simplicity two regional market i-th and j-th linked
by an entrepreneurial line, see Fig. 8. We denote their price-volume bids
as Ei(x) and Ej(x), the °ow and losses in the entrepreneurial line as e and
LE(e), the coe±cient that shows how these losses are apportioned to the
i-th and j-th regions as ®e and the contribution of the line to the net energy
balances in the i-th and j-th regions (amount °own in/out of the region)
as qei and qej. The dispatch is then found by solving the extended optimal
dispatch problem (4), (5), (25), (2),














subject to regional energy balances
qi = di ¡
X
j
(gij ¡ ®ijLij(gij)) + e + ®eLE(e); (30)
range constraints (25), and
e
min · e · e
max (31)
12furthermore balances for the entrepreneurial line
qei = e + ®eLE(e); qej = ¡e + (1 ¡ ®e)LE(e); qei + qej = LE(e) (32)
In (29) sign(s) = 1 if s ¸ 0 and sign(x) = ¡1 if x < 0. This re°ects
the nature of operations by entrepreneurial line - it °ows energy from one
regional market to another. The cost of generation now includes the cost of
supply for entrepreneurial line itself. If °ow is directed from i to j then the
extra term corresponding to this cost isC(qei) =
R qei
0 Ei(x)dx, if the energy
is transferred from j to i then this added term os C(qej) =
R qej
0 Ej(x)dx. For
















If e belongs to an interval where function Ei(:)is continuous, then the
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Figure 8: Entrepreneurial inter-connectors.
13That is, the highest price band dispatched via the entrepreneurial line is
determined by the di®erence between spot prices in these two markets plus
correctional term that depends on the network losses in entrepreneurial line.
In algorithmic terms if
Pi(1 + ®eLE
0) + Pj(¡1 + (1 ¡ ®e)LE
0) < Ei(e)(1 + ®eLE
0) (35)
then one needs to increase e until this condition is no longer true.
Conclusions
The dispatch and pricing problem for single-period electricity auction in a
network of regional markets is considered. Its conditions of optimality are
derived and solved. It is shown these conditions require that the values of
some well-de¯ned function, called reduce price, in connected regional mar-
kets be as close to each other as possible. Computational algorithms for
solving these conditions numerically are constructed. It is shown that dis-
patch problem is non-convex if negative prices are used in bids. The dynamic
programming based algorithm for calculation of the lower bound on the cost
of generation is constructed. It is shown how it can be used to verify if the
obtained solution is global.
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